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Priority No. 2 (not incarcerated) 
Case. 981538-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice as part of a plea 
agreement (R. 41-47) After imposition of sentence, i.e., probation, the court, convened a 
iestituimn heating and consequently MHIITHI defendant to pay restitution for ahomicide 
that occurred on July 24,1996 (R. 77-78). That order of restitution was entered on 
August 14, 1998; defendant filed a timely appeal thirteen days later (R. 79.) Defendant 
appeals only the order of restitution. This Court has original appellate jurisdiction 
pursuaui to Ulan i ode ,AIIII J I"K .la HV in Mipp 1098). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Since defendant was not convicted of any criminal conduct relating to the cause of 
death of Lonnie Durazo, were defendant's admissions sufficient to make her liable for 
restitution arising froni "lb: death IIIMII"' '" \\A\\ « YHi; Aim. >L; 7 M 2Gl(8)(a)(Supp. 1998)? 
Whether defendant's statements constituted admissions for purposes of that statute is a 
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question of law and this Court grants no deference to the trial court's conclusion. State v. 
Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995). The State confesses error here because the 
defendant did not admit to any criminal conduct that caused the homicide of Lonnie 
Durazo. 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1998) is reproduced in Addendum A and cited 
throughout the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State initially charged defendant with criminal homicide murder, resulting 
from Mr. Durazo's death, and attempted criminal homicide murder, for injuries inflicted 
upon Melissa Fraga (R. 10). She was charged with several other individuals for the same 
offenses (Id.). Eventually, defendant pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice (R. 
41). In her plea agreement certificate, she admitted only that she "attempted to dispose of 
physical evidence in a criminal case by allowing it to be sold to another person, to wit: a 
car" (R. 42). 
At her sentencing hearing, defendant made the following statement, but carefully 
did not admit to any criminal conduct regarding the homicide. 
Basically, I just want to say that I know I have been caught in the 
middle of a situation which I guess I have inappropriately acted. I feel 
really bad about it. It has caused me a lot of emotional stress and it is all I 
guess my fault. I realize, you know, the importance of leading a straight 
life. I feel really bad. I want to apologize to the victim's family. 
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(Tr. Sentencing Hearing, Case No. 971015103, Feb. 2,1998 at 6. Defendant made 
similar statements to the PSI investigator and the caseworker at the Utah State Prison 
during her diagnostic evaluation. In the PSI, the following information appears: 
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: 
"A homcide [sic] occurred. Which at the time I was unaware 
of. One year later. I sold my car when I learned it was 
involved in a crime. I am very sorry for what happened. I am 
sick thinking about the potential punishment for the crime. I 
have grown and learned from this experience and Im [sic] 
ready to move forward with my new lifestyle." 
Comments: During the presentence interview Ms. Watson stated that from 
the information she has 'pieced together,' a girlfriend, Melissa Parker, 
asked her to give the people a ride, but she did not know the people. She 
said she 'must have' driven the people to a house, the people must have 
gotten out of the car, committed the crime, came back and got in the car and 
they left. She did not know a crime had been committed and can not [sic] 
recalled [sic] the specific day or what happened other than she was with 
Mellisa. Ms. Watson stated that she is not guilty of what she pled to and 
thinks could be acquitted if she took it to trial; however, she was 'greedy' 
and wanted to be out of jail, so she took the plea bargain. 
Presentence Investigation Report at 2. 
During her diagnostic evaluation, defendant made an additional statement, though 
similar in nature to the one given to the PSI interviewer. 
Defendant's Version (update): Ms. Watson made the following additional 
statement. 
I met this girl at a party on July 4,1996. I used to go to 
parties to get to know people in the music and rap industry. I 
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wanted to be a main singer and not a backup singer. I sing R 
and B and was going to start out singing for rap artists. I met 
Melissa. I had barely gotten my car the month before and 
hadn't been out much. She and I were some of the only white 
girls there. We went to this party a couple weeks later. We 
didn't like it so we went to Main Street on the 23rd (day before 
Pioneer Day parade) where everyone was camping out. We 
were with all kinds of girls I had never met before. One of 
her girlfriends got lost in the crowd. We thought she might 
find her way back to the party. She was there. These guys 
were drunk and said they needed a ride. I didn't know where 
they lived so I just followed directions. It was dark and I 
didn't know the area. They said to pull over and they were 
going to get out. They asked me to wait a minute. I was in a 
hurry and said ok but hurry up. I heard gunshots far away and 
wasn't sure that's what they were or if it was firecrackers. 
They came running back to my car and said let's go. I 
thought they might have been shot at because they were 
running. I never asked what happened. I was nervous 
because they were running. This was none of my business. I 
took my girlfriend home and dropped them off somewhere. 
I'm not sure where it was 
Diagnostic Evaluation Report at 2. 
At the restitution hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to reimburse the Utah 
Crime Victims' Reparations Fund monies paid to the victim's family. This order was for 
joint and several liability with the co-defendants (R. 77-78). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20 l(8)(a) allows a court to order restitution only if the 
defendant has been convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary damages, agrees to pay 
restitution, or admits to the criminal conduct. Defendant did not admit to the homicide, 
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i.e., the criminal conduct for which the restitution was ordered. Consequently, the 
restitution order lacks the requisite factual basis. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS WERE UNRELATED TO 
THE DAMAGES FOR WHICH SHE WAS ORDERED TO PAY 
RESTITUTION, 1 HE ORDER WAS IMPROPER AND SHOULD BE 
VACATED. 
Defendant admitted driving a group of people to what turned out to be a gang 
shooting. She admitted and pled guilty to attempted obstruction of justice for selling the 
car she used to make that drive. However, none of these statement admit to the criminal 
conduct that resulted in the victim's death. It therefore does not fall within the definition 
of restitution that state law allows to be awarded. Subsection 76-3-20 l(8)(a) states that 
"[f]or the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall include any 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court...." 
Though Utah's appellate courts have never before analyzed this portion of the 
restitution statute, Oregon's appellate courts have done so. Those cases are helpful 
because Utah's restitution statute is modeled after Oregon's. State v. Depaoli, 835 P.2d 
162, 163-64 (Utah 1992); State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998). In 
State v. Sigman, 919 P.2d 45, 483 (Or. 1996), the Oregon Court of Appeals was called 
upon to determine the propriety of a restitution order when the defendant had not been 
convicted of the conduct and had not admitted to it. It stated: 
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The evidence must show that the pecuniary damage that is the 
subject of a restitution order was caused by an offense of 
which the defendant was convicted or to which he or she 
admitted having committed A person may not be ordered 
to pay restitution for a crime for which he neither was 
convicted nor admitted committing. 
Sigman, at 484-85. Similar is State v. Voetberg, 781 P.2d 387 (Or. 1989) where the court 
of appeals reversed an order of restitution because, not only did the defendant not admit 
personal liability, but adamantly denied it. Under Oregon law too, a defendant's actual 
responsibility for criminal conduct must be established with some formality. 
For the purposes of determining the basis for restitution, the 
admission of a defendant is essentially the same as a plea of 
guilty that would support a conviction Because such an 
admission can result in liability for substantial sums of 
money, defendant's responsibility for the criminal activities 
ought to be firmly established. 
State v. Boswell 628 P.2d 763, 768 (Richardson, P.J., concurring) (Or. 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
Because defendant did not admit to criminal conduct leading to the death of the 
victim, the trial court's order of restitution is incorrect and should be vacated. This 
reversal should not result in any other change to defendant's conviction or sentence as she 
has not otherwise challenged them. This Court should exercise its power under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) to modify defendant's sentence as necessary. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS $_ April 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
TAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed — Civil penalties — 
Restitution — Hearing — Definitions. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is convicted or 
any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, 
which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money 
equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses 
including earnings and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to 
a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured damages, 
and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as 
further defined in Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a person 
convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27,1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
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(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or 
for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in 
Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the 
criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall 
enter an order of complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) on the civil 
judgment docket and provide notice of the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered may seek 
enforcement of the restitution order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose favor 
the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of restitution and the 
victim or department elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process, the victim 
shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a 
judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a 
judgment for money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from 
the time of sentencing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the restitution 
payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to 
interest in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter 30, 
Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in 
the county to which he has been returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence 
it may impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any 
governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the 
criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
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(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the time of 
sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (8). 
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, the defendant 
shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of court-ordered 
restitution to the victim. 
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a 
judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a 
judgment for money in a civil action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from 
the time of sentencing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the restitution 
payments to be credited to principal first and the remainder of payments credited to 
interest in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on 
the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence tf e court may impose, the court shall 
order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the 
defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another within the state 
at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental 
transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure to appear 
a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported; 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported. 
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(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each 
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a 
single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of 
three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the term 
of middle severity unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the 
crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a statement 
identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If 
the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the court and served on the opposing 
party at least four days prior to the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the 
highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case, the probation 
officer's report, other reports, including reports received under Section 76-3-404, 
statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, 
and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons for 
imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing guidelines 
regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal and 
Juvenile Justice. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of a 
child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the 
defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is set forth in the 
information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury 
at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. 
This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court 
or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense, that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes 
any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the 
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, 
the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and 
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treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the 
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense 
resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on 
other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of 
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the 
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under this subsection, 
substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the victim. 
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AUG 1 <t 1998 
David C. Cundick, #4817 
PARKER, FREESTONE & ANGERHOFER, PC 
50 West 300 South, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)328-5600 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




Case No. 971015103 
ELLIE WATSON, : 
Judge Medley 
Defendant. 
On the 22nd day of June, 1998, the Court heard arguments on the defendant's opposition to 
payment of restitution. The defendant was represented by her attorney, David C. Cundick. The 
State of Utah was represented by Carlos Esqueda. The Court, having considered the arguments of 
counsel and for good cause appearing, now enters the following 
O R D E R 
1. Defendant Ellie Watson is hereby ordered to pay restitution in such amount as have 
been made of the Victim's Reparation's Fund relating to the death of Lonnie Durazo. 
Jk.. 
v .^ /dcr * 
1 
2. Adult Probation and Parole is to contact the Victim's Reparation's Fund and report 
to the Court the amount of restitution owed and to contact the defendant to arrange for monthly 
payments of such amount. 
DATED this fj day of August, 1998. 
'COURT 
svjjlj 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, 
Thkd/DIstrict Court Judge v 
Vincent Meister, 
Attorney for State of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the-3th- day ofJafy, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following parties at the addresses indicated. 
Vincent Meister, Esq. 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
2 
